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SecurityAbstract Interoperability in healthcare environment deals with sharing of patient’s Electronic
Health Records (EHR) with fellow professionals in inter as well as intra departments or organiza-
tions. Healthcare environment experiences frequent shifting of doctors, paramedical staff in inter as
well as intra departments or hospitals. The system exhibits dynamic attributes of users and
resources managed through access control policies defined for that environment. Rules obtained
on merging of such policies often generate policy-conflicts thereby resulting in undue data leakages
to unintended users. This paper proposes an access control framework that applies a Hierarchy
Similarity Analyzer (HSA) on the policies need to be merged. It calculates a Security_Level (SL)
and assigns it to the users sharing data. The SL determines the authorized amount of data that
can be shared on successful collaboration of two policies. The proposed framework allows integra-
tion of independent policies and identifies the possible policy-conflicts arising due to attribute dis-
parities in defined rules. The framework is implemented on XACML policies and compared with
other access models designed using centralized and decentralized approaches. Conditional con-
straints and properties are defined that generate policy-conflicts as prevalent in the policies.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under the CCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Healthcare is a time-bound service. The major advantage of
electronic health care record is timely availability of health
data at any desired location so that patient can get appropriate
treatment. Along with timely retrieval of health data, equally
important is the assurance of maintaining the confidentiality
and privacy of patient’s health records. This is more complexta shar-
.1016/j.
2 S. Bhartiya et al.for health environment primary due to frequent shift of roles,
departments and duties. Today is an era of distributed com-
puting (Xiao et al., 2009) where users of different organiza-
tions need to collaborate and access each other’s resources.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Privacy Rule of 1996 establishes guidelines for strengthening
the privacy and security protections for individual’s Electronic
Health Records(EHRs) in such collaborations.
An interoperable health system facilitates use of software
applications for exchanging data by maintaining many-to-
many relationship between health care provider, patients and
data resources. This approach provide better integration and
sharing but also demand a framework that ensures privacy
and security which can be achieved by designing proper poli-
cies for the disclosure and use of health care information.
Achieving interoperability in an open and dynamic healthcare
environment is a difficult task (Bhartiya and Mehrotra, 2013)
and requires a cooperative access control approach to achieve
secured sharing of authorized data to the users. Traditional
access control framework varies between centralized to decen-
tralized access control approaches and for sharing of EHR
among different organization, access for secured sharing can
be controlled and managed either through centralized or
decentralized approach.
The centralized access control approach (Carmagnola et al.,
2000) relies on a central authority for permitting/denying
access to the required resources. It results in consistent and
uniform supply of data to the legitimate users. The centralized
control of access reduces administrative effort of managing the
resources but also is vulnerable in terms of security threats.
Usually in an interoperable environment, it is not possible to
design a centralized access control model. A need exist to
design an authorization system (NIST SP 800–162) in order
to maintain proper integrity, confidentiality and availability
of the data. Decentralized approach (Saltman et al., 2007) dis-
tributes the authority to the person nearer to the resource.
Each decentralized system has its own conceptual storage
and hierarchies of users and resources. The powers of permit-
ting/denying access to the data are distributed to each person
who leads one or more team in an organization. This approach
is the most sought in ubiquitous computing environments
directly exchanging data in peer-to-peer manner. This model
lacks consistency controls but ensures quick access to data
and other resources.
Accessing data in interoperable environment also experi-
ences contradictory or undefined authorizations necessary for
administering the accountability on sharing of data between
disparate systems. Another relevant issue while integrating dis-
parate access control policies is the emergence of policy-
conflicts where two or more rule may contradict with each
other. Information sharing in healthcare environment is usu-
ally dynamic. It requires preserving the availability, integrity
and confidentiality of EHRs that may differ with each patient’s
need.
A framework proposed in this paper considers Attribute
based access model (ABAC) as its base model. Attribute based
access model (ABAC) (Hu et al., 2013) is a logical access con-
trol methodology where rule attributes are evaluated to deter-
mine the authorization for performing the set of defined
operations. The idea is to fine-grain the available access con-
trol policies on the basis of the user’s hierarchical positions
in their respective organizations. It requires designing ofPlease cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
jksuci.2015.08.005framework that follows the principles of least privilege ensur-
ing generation of only the relevant rules. Due consideration is
given to preserve the internal consistency and authorization
while refining the given policies.
This paper is divided into 6 sections. Section 1 explains the
need and significance of interoperable healthcare environment
and the problems in integrating disparate access control poli-
cies. Section 2 consolidates the work done in past and per-
forms a comparative analysis of various access control
models with the proposed framework. Section 3 presents the
framework proposed and XACML schema used for designing
and verifying the access control policies listed in Appendix A.
Section 4 represents the healthcare organizational hierarchies
with respect to user and resource attributes. Section 5 deals
with verification of the proposed framework using an auto-
mated simulator, Access Control Policy Testing (ACPT).
The verification is justified through a case study that illustrate
the implementation of the framework and its comparison with
other approaches. Section 6 concludes and interprets the
results obtained that justify the viability of the proposed
framework.2. Literature review
A lot of research has been conducted in past for combining
and integrating access control models without exposing the
data to illegal and unauthorized disclosure. Each model rep-
resent unique features (Karp et al., 2010) that make it differ-
ent from other models, both, syntactically and semantically.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model depends on
access control lists (ACLs) for determining authorization.
In healthcare environment the users experience frequent shift
in roles, hence, ACLs need to be optimized (Al-Abdulmohsin,
2009) for quick and secured access to the data. Mandatory
Access Control (MAC) model is based on labeling on the
resource and the user’s credentials. In this environment the
variables change once for all and hence cannot respond to
dynamically changing environments like healthcare where
resource levels change dynamically and require to be in syn-
chronization with the change in user’s credentials. Role-based
access (RBAC) model (Sandhu et al., 1996; Nyanchama and
Osborn, 1999) developed a role-based model using graph the-
ory. It simplifies the security management but challenges the
administration of the organizations where several roles are
managed for the users simultaneously. The major emphasis
is on fine-grain the existing access control policies while
designing the secured and interoperable EHR framework.
Various techniques have been deployed to fine-grain access
control models with an objective of providing secured and flex-
ible access to the data. Setting up authorization is dependent
on the storage mechanism adopted by a particular application.
The authorizations may differ in centralized and distributed
approach of data storage. Bertino et al. (1994) addresses the
semantic data modeling concepts and develops an integrated
authorization for interoperable relational and object-oriented
databases. Azeez and Venter (2013) propose and simulate
RBAC framework that satisfies authorizations and enforces
interoperable, scalable and suitable access control for multi-
domain grid-based environment. A middleware proposed by
Ciampi et al. (2010) evaluates the interoperability facilities in
an agent-based architecture where authorizations aresed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Table 1 Comparative Study of HSA and other access control frameworks/models.
Features Models
The role graph model
(Nyanchama and
Osborn, 1999)
BPD-ACS
(Chandramouli,
2000)
Privacy preserving
Model (Yang et al.,
2008)
Health Agents
system (Xiao
et al., 2009)
Open Agent
Architecture (OAA)-
(Ciampi et al., 2010)
HSA
Type RBAC RBAC2 PBAC Hybrid (DAC,
MAC, RBAC)
Virtual Systems ABAC
Interoperability X X X
p p p
Heterogeneity X X X
p p
X
Authorization
p p
X X X
p
Access relevant
data
p p p
X X
p
Dynamism
p
X
p p p p
Resolve policy-
conflicts
X X X X X
Simple to
implement
p p p
X
p p
flexibility
p p p p p p
Level of
granularity
Fine Medium Medium Fine Low Fine
Govt.
regulations
X
p p
X X X
Computation
load
Low Medium Medium Low High Low
Electronic Health Record data sharing approach 3determined to control the interaction between various agents.
This paper focuses on integration of disparate healthcare sys-
tems each implementing own data access policies and con-
straints. Various access control models are compared to
identify their robustness and dependability in ascertaining
secured sharing of EHR under well-defined authorizations.
Table 1 shows a comparative study of our framework with
these models on most important features (Bhartiya and
Mehrotra, 2013) ascertaining secured sharing of sensitive data
among legitimate stakeholders.
How far the proposed framework satisfies above mentioned
parameters must be ascertained using relevant testing and ver-
ification tool. The comparison process can be light-weight with
low computational effort compromising on the accuracy of
results or can be computationally expensive with more accu-
rate methods such as Boolean checking or semantic analysis.
Testing can also be done by simulating the proposed frame-
work and comparing it with existing models and approaches.
Automated testing expands the testing boundaries enabling
verification of generated request through an exhaustive state-
space search. The literature reveals various verification tools
Margrave (Fisler et al., 2005), Cirg (Martin and Xie, 2007),
PoliVer (Koleini and Ryan, 2011), ACPT (Hwang et al.,
2010) capable of testing similar applications. These and many
other such tools can verify the access policies using one or the
other fault-detection techniques such as logical formulas (Hu
and Kuhn, 2011) of temporal logic (Computational Tree Logic
(CTL) and Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL)). The prerequi-
site of each tool differs in their requirement for producing the
test results.
An algorithm proposed by Lin et al. (2007) iterates through
all rules in policy set of each organization and calculates sim-
ilarities between each rule attribute of both policies. It determi-
nes the closeness of two policies concluding the probability
that the two policies can securely integrate with each other.Please cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
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and authorized access of EHR considering all disparities
prevalent in the access policies. In healthcare domain, one user
works in different role-capacity at any given point of time.
Moreover, there can be various entry and exit points of access-
ing data at the same time. A doctor in the role of primary doc-
tor for one patient may shift to the role of specialist for other
patient at the same time. The access rights must differ in both
the situations. Moreover, the authority is not static. A doctor
being a part of team handled by a senior consultant may be
practicing independently in the same hospital. The account-
ability and responsibility must differ in both the situations.
Hence, it is challenging to determine authorized and consoli-
dated access to EHRs.3. Proposed framework
With an ever increasing volume of electronic data and
advancement in technological resources, it becomes difficult
and unmanageable to control and limit access to authorized
users. Each system is autonomous comprising unique domain
structure or hierarchy and security policies. When a policy
conflict arise, it is difficult to give weight-age to any policy
for selecting the best choice. Moreover, there is no universal
method of resolving policy conflicts (Zidat and Djoudi, 2006).
Bhartiya and Mehrotra (2015) conducted CHAID analysis
using questionnaire-based study in real-time health environ-
ment of various hospitals and related agencies. Observations
revealed the possibility of defining local authorization using
positional distances of each healthcare user in the organiza-
tional hierarchy. Hence, it strengthened the certainty of identi-
fying similarities between rules attributes of access control
policies by calculating the positional distance of each user in
their respective organizational hierarchies. It would furthersed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Figure 1 Proposed framework for fine-graining XACML poli-
cies using HSA.
4 S. Bhartiya et al.impose robust authorization, thereby, enhancing the availabil-
ity of EHR without compromising its confidentiality and
privacy. Each rule comprises multiple attributes that are either
categorical or numerical in nature. Thus a system can be
designed by deducing similarities between access control poli-
cies in sharable health care systems based Lin et al., 2007
approach. The similarities are obtained using Hierarchy Simi-
larity Analyzer1 (HSA) that finds the unique values from the
similarity scores obtained on comparing two distant organiza-
tional hierarchies. The values are then assigned to each user as
Security_level2 (SL) thus bridging the interoperability gap
between disparate healthcare environments.
The proposed framework (Fig. 1) extends the XACML
structure. Two or more health care units collaborate and
allow access to each other’s data repository. Complexities
increase due to heterogeneity of data and storage structure
adopted by each unit. The framework comprises of a Hierar-
chy Similarity Analyzer algorithm that finds similarities
between rule attributes defined in disparate policies (P1,
P2. . ...,Pn). The HSA (Hierarchy Similarity Analyzer) calcu-
lates the similarity score for all matched and unmatched attri-
butes based on the hierarchical distance of users and resource
(EHR) in their respective hierarchies. The rules are fine-
grained by allocating a Security_Level (SL) to each user
and resource attribute in the given rule set. Authorizations
are added in the existing rule-sets by assigning SLs obtained
from HSA. Authorizations ensure secured sharing of EHR
using simple security rule where a user at lower level can
access high-level resource only under the authorization of a
higher level user. The user generates a request demanding1 Hierarchy Similarity Analyzer.
2 Security_Level.
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jksuci.2015.08.005an access to the data. The refined policies are merged (Policy
Combining point) using chosen rule combining algorithm. The
rules are evaluated (Policy Evaluation Point) to satisfy the
environmental constraints and set authorization. A reduced
rule-set is thus obtained. These rules are then merged,
thereby, handling policy conflicts (Policy Decision Point)
and a final decision (Permit/Deny Decision) is obtained to
either permit or deny access to the requested data.
Standard such as Extensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) provide a template for designing flexible
and dynamic access control policy framework and is widely
used for environment that supports interoperability and also
heterogeneity. Basic elements of XACML include Policy Set,
Policy, Rule, Target and Condition. Policy set refers to the
set of access control policies defined in the organizations.
The Policy contains the rules defined in each policy set. Each
rule comprise of a set of Subject, Resource and Action
described as S, R, and A respectively. Each of these compo-
nents is associated with a set of attributes having one or more
attribute values that are used for taking access control deci-
sions. The Target (T) specifies the user or resource controlling
the access through defined rules and policies. The Condition
element (C) is optional and imposes constraint on the rules,
if required. The Effect (E) in the rule is a decision component
for granting or denying an access to the data. An access
request is a tuple {s, r,a} where s  S, r  R, a  A have mul-
tiple attributes. Whenever an access request is made, it is
passed to a software component called Policy Decision Point
(PDP) that evaluates the request against the given access con-
trol policies and provides permit or deny decisions accord-
ingly. ABAC designed using XACML defines the following
possible states of allowing access of EHR to the legitimate
users:
Definition 1. An ABAC rule r states: if C then E, i.e. if
condition C is satisfied the Effect E is permitted. For ex. if the
access control policy of specialist enlists a rule permitting write
operation on the patient’s diagnostic records and condition
defined allows a write access to the specialist, the decision would
be permit.
Definition 2. An ABAC rule r states: if S and R then E, i.e. if
attribute values of both subject S and resource R is satisfied, the
Effect E is permitted. For ex. if the policy rule allows the Fam-
ily doctor unconditional access to the Clinical records of the
patient, and no property is defined to restrict such access,
the decision would be permit.
The above definitions can be expanded to include more
relationships between various other components in rule-
sets. The problem is that these definitions do represent clear
and simple integration of various policies but encompass
policy conflicts and rule redundancies. Thus, fine-graining
of policies is needed so as to restrict undue disclosure of
sensitive health records especially in interoperable
environment.
Implementation of proposed framework:
1. Categorizing the rules
Primarily there are two rules termed as Permit Rules (PR)
and Deny Rules (DR). Access control policies comprise
PR for permit decisions and DR as denial decisions forsed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Figure 2 User hierarchy in healthcare domain.
Figure 3 Resource hierarchy in healthcare domain.
Electronic Health Record data sharing approach 5each rule accordingly. Each rule is checked against Effect
(E) and store the valid permit and deny rules of all policies
participating to share the data.
2. Identifying attribute and assigning them values
Each PR or DR rule contains attributes {a1, a2, a3. . ...}
having values (vi1, vi2,. . .. . .,vin) that are of two types-
categorical or numerical. For instance, an attribute ‘Role’
of element Subject contains values like Family_Doc,
Matron, and Patient that belong to categorical type. All
integers or date/time type values belong to the numeric type
like time from 8.00 to 16.00.
3. Calculating the similarity score for attributes with categor-
ical values
The hierarchical distance between two categorical attributes
is calculated for each value of attributes (a1,a2) to find the
shortest path (SPathðv1; v2), Eq. (1)) in the hierarchy
(Figs 2 and 3). A compensating score d is calculated (Eq.
(2)) as an average similarity score for all unmatched
attributes.
Scatðv1k; v2lÞ ¼ 1 SPathðv1k; v2lÞ
2H
ð1Þ
where SPathðv1k; v2lÞ denotes the length of the shortest path
between two values v1k; v2l of attributes(a1,a2) in P1 and P2
respectively, and H is the height of the domain hierarchy.
d ¼
l
P
ðv1k;Þ
2Mv
PNv2
l¼1 ScatðV1k;V2lÞ
Nv2
; Nv1 > Nv2P
ð;v2lÞ2Mv
PNv1
k¼1ScatðV1k;V2lÞ
Nv1
; Nv1 < Nv2
8>><
>>:
ð2Þ
4. Calculating the similarity score for attributes with
numerical valuesThe similarity of two numerical attri-
bute values (v1,v2) is based on the difference between
the two values. The hierarchical distance between two
numerical attributes is calculated for each value using
Eq. (3). A compensating score d is calculated (Eq. (4))
as an average similarity score for all unmatched numer-
ical attributes.
Snumðv1; v2Þ ¼ jv1 v2j
maxðv1; v2Þ ð3Þ
d ¼
P
ðv1k;Þ 2 Mv
PNv2
l¼1 SnumðV1k;V2lÞ
Nv2
; Nv1 > Nv2P
ð;v2lÞ2Mv
PNv1
k¼1SnumðV1k;V2lÞ
Nv1
; Nv1 < Nv2
8>><
>>:
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algorithm
Implementation of HSA can be well understood through
the flowchart shown in (Fig. 4). After evaluating the
positional distances in the observed hierarchies through
scatðv1;v2Þ and Snumðv1;v2Þ, multiple similarity score are
obtained for similar rule attributes of disparate policies.
Average of similarity score is then calculated for each
attribute values. A unique set of similarity scores is
generated and stored in 1-D array. Accordingly assign
Security_Level (SL) to the Subject and Resource
attribute of each PR (DR) rules in the given policies.
It is assumed that A can return unique set of values irre-
spective of the type of array i.e. categorical or numerical array.
A is an intersection of rows and columns and a similar set of
rows and columns are returned in C in sorted order. S returns
the position of each value in the array A which is used to assign
the unique values obtained in C accordingly.
The above framework can be implemented for any opera-
tional scenario and case study is considered where three units
of hospital are interacting for sharing of document. The frame-
work is compared with traditional centralized and distributed
environment where HSA is not implemented.
4. Operational scenario
Each organization has its own set of guidelines for framing the
access control policies for its users. A case is taken where a
patient’s diagnostic data needs to be accessed by a physician
belonging to some other healthcare organization. The health
professionals considered for this case study are: Patient, Fam-
ily Doctor alias attending physician, HOD and Nurse. For
identifying the robustness of our framework, three policies
are designed in ACPT for each model, i.e. centralized, decen-
tralized and HSA-refined access control framework. A prop-
erty or a query is generated that is then inputted in all the
three models. Figs. 5–7 illustrates the integration of varied
policies in each model.
Each hospital unit has users sub-divided into various roles
as shown in Fig. 2. One of the hierarchies consists of HOD
managing doctors and interns. Other hierarchy identifies
paramedical staff headed by Matron. Patient moves in vari-
ous departments and uses facilities during his visit to the
hospital.
Fig. 3 represents the EHR hierarchy assumed to be the
same in all hospitals. EHR hierarchy is broadly categorized
in three heads, personal, clinical and billing heads. The
personal head is represented as ‘demographic data’ holdingsed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Figure 4 Implementation of HSA-based approach of securely sharing EHR in interoperable environment.
6 S. Bhartiya et al.patient’s personal and nominee’s details. The Clinical
head groups the symptoms, laboratory tests, reports and
prescriptions under different heads. All billing and insurance
details are stored under Financial head.
The user and resource hierarchies in Figs. 2 and 3 are used
to define access control policies in centralized, decentralized
and HSA-based approaches. Each attribute of a rule in one
policy is matched with similar attribute of a rule in other
policies within the same approach. Specifically for HSA-
based approach, similarity (Range 0–1) is obtained for all
attributes exhibiting similar rules in the given policies (P1,
P2, P3). Similarity score is converted into security level and
assigned to each user/resource attribute defined in the respec-
tive rule. The lowest SL begins at value 1 chronologically
increasing with higher scores. Evaluating the rules further
generates the specific and only relevant rules that meet thePlease cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
jksuci.2015.08.005specified conditions. One of the hierarchical similarities in
the Subject attribute that is categorical type is shown in
Table 2.
In order to evaluate the Compensating score d for non-
matching attributes the highest similarity score in v12, v21,
v31 (0.66) and v13, v21, v31(0.83) is considered and d is
obtained. Compensating scores for non-matching attributes
in other rules are evaluated similarly.
To simplify the calculations, the similarity scores are con-
verted into integers starting from 1. For instance, the simi-
larity score between different roles in P1, P2 and P3 is 1,
0.83 and 0.67 which is simplified and converted to 3, 2
and 1 respectively. Wherever, no similarity is obtained, the
value assigned to SL is 0. The results shown are confined
to only those rules that are affected on generation of the
request.sed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Table 3 Assigning SL to user attribute.
HOD Nurse Family_Doc
HOD 3 2 1
Nurse 2 3 1
Family_Doc 1 1 3
Figure 6 NuSMV verification for decentralized access control
policy set.
Figure 5 NuSMV verification for centralized access control
policy set.
Table 2 Similarity score between subjects’ attributes of P1, P2
and P3.
v11
(HOD)
v12
(Nurse)
v13
(Family_Doc)
v31 (HOD) v21 (HOD) 1 .66 .83
v22 (Nurse) .66 .66 .50
v23
(Family_Doc)
.83 .50 .83
v32 (Nurse) v21 (HOD) .66 .66 .50
v22 (Nurse) .66 1 .83
v23
(Family_Doc)
.83 .67 .83
v33
(Family_Doc)
v21 (HOD) .83 .50 .83
v22 (Nurse) .50 .83 .67
v23
(Family_Doc)
.83 .83 1
Absolute similarity pair: (v11,v21,v31), (v12,v22,v32), (v13,v23,
v33).
Figure 7 NuSMV verification for HSA-refined policy set.
Electronic Health Record data sharing approach 74.1. Assigning Security_Level (SL) using HSA
HSA is implemented using MatLab, an analytical rule and
Security Levels are obtained. SLs assigned to user attribute
in all the rules of each policy are shown in Table 3. Precedence
of P1 in P2 and P3 and vice versa is checked while assigning the
SL to the user or resource attributes for each PR (DR) rules in
all the policies.
5. Implementation of HSA
The proposed framework is implemented to identify and elimi-
nate irrelevant roles and unauthorized exposure of data result-
ing from merging of disparate policies. Analysis focuses onPlease cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
jksuci.2015.08.005correctness and ability of the policies allowing secured sharing
of sensitive data to only the legitimate and authorized users.
Access Control Policy Testing (ACPT) tool (Hwang et al.,
2010) developed by NIST allows to simulate different policies
in different environments. It is cross-platform compatible and
written in Java. NuSMv (Cimatti et al., 2002), a verification tool
is integrated in ACPT that specifies how a particular rulesed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
8 S. Bhartiya et al.complies. NuSMV takes into account the defined or set states
and the specified properties as input. NuSMV is linked to a
MiniSat SAT solver to detect and falsify defined properties
through the generation of counterexample for predefined set
of states. Counterexamples illustrate semantic differences
between the two policies. More specifically, each counterexam-
ple represents a request that evaluates to a different response
when applied to selected policy versions.
5.1. Policy coverage
In policy testing, a request is provided as test input that gener-
ates matching and non-matching access rules as test outputs.
XACML policies comprise of three major components: Poli-
cies, Rules and Conditions. A policy tester must thrive to gen-
erate requests that achieve 100% policy, rule and condition
coverage. The coverage (Martin and Xie, 2007) is defined as
the possibility of the stated component contributing to the
decision obtained on the generated request.
5.1.1. Policy coverage
The number of policies under test divided by the total number
of policies existing in the given environment.
5.1.2. Rule coverage
The number of rules corresponding to the request made
divided by the total number of rules existing in the given
environment.
5.1.3. Condition coverage
The number of Boolean conditions involved for the policies
and rules under test divided by two times the number of
conditions.
ACPT is capable to fulfill all three requirements. As multiple
rules generatemultiple decisions for the same request due to rule
overlapping, ACPT specifies the precedence between rules by
providing rule combination algorithms, namely, first applicable,
permit override and deny override to choose from. First-
applicable follows the decision in the first rule to report permit
or deny. In Permit override, permit decision takes precedence
whereas in Deny override, deny decision takes the precedence.
The framework is verified and tested against policy conflicts
and undefined resource access using any of these algorithms.
First Applicable Rule combining algorithm is adopted to
derive the verification decisions on merging of two policies.
It produces verification reports where if the property is true
in the policy no test cases are generated. On the other hand
if the property is violated, counterexamples are generated.
5.2. Property verification
ACPT generates a query to be verified against the property
defined for the policy(s) under test. More generally, it is a
method of investigating the behavior of the policy. Though,
it is not mandatory to define property for every generated
query, due to the large and complex policy rules, it becomes
difficult to handle and trace faults leading to security gaps in
the existing policy(s). The problem becomes graver when two
or more policies are integrated under imposed constraints or
conditions.Please cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
jksuci.2015.08.0055.2.1. Centralized access control framework
Centralized access control framework: The healthcare profes-
sionals are assigned with a predefined set of access rights. A
central manager assigns the authorizations for allowing/deny-
ing the access of data among the fellow professionals inside or
outside the organization. The access rights are static and
updated by the central manager on request of the concerned
user. Fig. 5 shows the NuSMV result obtained on verifying
the said property applied on three independent policies (P1,
P2 and P3 (Fig. 11: Appendix A)) controlled by a central man-
ager. Policy P2 and P3 permits the access of requested data to
the intended user whereas policy P1 exhibits conflicting rules
resulting in denial of access to the requested data.
Property: SPEC (Role = Family_Doc) & (EHR= Cl_diag)
& (MLSDefaultAction = read) & (Authorization = hod) ->
decision = Permit.
5.2.2. Decentralized access control framework
Decentralized access control framework: The health profession-
als are assigned with a predefined set of access rights. Access
rights and authorizations for the users are set by each local
manager under its hierarchy. Change to access rights is locally
handled enabling quick access to the required data. Integration
of disparate access control policies of three organizations (H1,
H2 and H3 (Fig. 10: Appendix A)) is shown in Fig. 6. Access
control policy of H3 results in permitting the access of the
required data whereas policy conflicts are identified in H1
and H2.
Property: SPEC (Role = Family_Doc) & (EHR= Cl_diag)
& (MLSDefaultAction = read) & (Authorization = HOD) &
(Patient_Consent = True) -> decision = Permit.
5.2.3. HSA refined policy set Hierarchy Similarity Analyzer
The health professionals are assigned with a set of access rights
either by central manager or a local manager as per the
approach followed in the organization. The user and resource
hierarchies of the organizations is provided to HSA that
assigns a security level (SL) for each user and resource attri-
bute in the given access control policies. The policies are fur-
ther refined by setting up of authorization ascertaining
permit/deny of data in interoperable healthcare environment.
Fig. 7 shows the results generated on integrating access control
policies of three different organizations (A1, A2, A3 (Fig. 9:
Appendix A)). On merging, policies of A2 and A3 represent
more similarity allowing access to the requested data as com-
pared with policy of A1 contradicting in terms of the generated
query.
Property: SPEC (Role = Family_Doc) & (EHR= Cl_diag)
& (MLSDefaultAction = read) & (Patient_Consent = True) &
(Authorization = HOD) & (Security_Level = 2) -> decision
= Permit.
5.3. Interpretation
A query is generated to identify the robustness and exactness
of each model when merged in interoperable environment.
The query bounds the policies for finding the exact match by
iterating into entire rule-sets. The property is verified using a
3-way covering array that generates test cases based on the
first-applicable policy combining algorithm. Table 4 identifiessed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Table 4 Rules obtained on merging policies in each approach.
Electronic Health Record data sharing approach 9policy-conflicts arising on merging disparate access control
policies. Access model based on centralized approach is most
vulnerable permitting the access to the data in-spite of non-
matching rules in the merged policy-set. Decentralized
approach based model depicts non-similarities in the merged
policies resulting into non-availability of access, hence,
delaying quality treatment to the patient. Authorizations are
set between various healthcare systems but are cost-extensive
while resetting dynamically. HSA-based model identifies
strong similarities between policies P2 and P3. Authorizations
are dynamically set between various healthcare systems and
the overhead of any change in the security level and authoriza-
tions correlates with the change in user or resource hierarchies.
The authorizations are set in one or the other policy affectingFigure 8 Verifying interoperable shar
Please cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
jksuci.2015.08.005the confidentiality and privacy of EHRs when shared in an
open environment. Table 4 shows the vulnerabilities that either
result in no or undue disclosure of data. Moreover, centralized
approach defines implicit or static environmental settings.
Incorporating changes to achieve interoperability is very diffi-
cult and time-consuming. Centralized approach exhibits high-
est confidentiality in single environment. The confidentiality is
compromised when the policies under this approach merged to
allow sharing in disparate healthcare environment. Organiza-
tions following decentralized approach are not bounded to fol-
low any standard rules and guidelines in framing access rules,
hence, results in stringent security measures denying access to
the required data. The availability of data is highly affected in
this approach. HSA-based models fine-grains the existing poli-ing of EHR in various approaches.
sed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
10 S. Bhartiya et al.cies dynamically deciding the amount of data allowed to be
accessed by the legitimate users. The confidentiality and avail-
ability of data is higher than the other two approaches. Policy-
conflicts are minimized through clearly defined authorizationsFigure 9 HSA-refined XACML policies of
Please cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
jksuci.2015.08.005that are dynamically set according to the responsibilities and
accountability of the concerned user.
Merging of P1, P2 and P3 in each access model approach
reveals substantial decisions for allowing or denying accessthree disparate healthcare organizations.
sed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Fig. 9 (continued)
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12 S. Bhartiya et al.to the data. In the centralized approach, for instance (high-
lighted in Table 4), access of the queried data is permitted to
nurse in P3 only whereas the decision applies to all the policies
merged together. It risks the data to undue disclosure and
confidentiality breaches. In certain cases, Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 1996) overrides
sharing of records between various agencies even if patient’s
consent is not available. The verification result identifies such
vulnerabilities if existing in the rule sets as shown in Table 4.
Decentralized approach on the other hand presents a more
stringent security model where only if similar rules exist in each
policy, the decision would be permit otherwise it would result
in denial of access. The contradiction and policy-conflict are
handled by simply denying an access to the data like property
stands true in P1 but still the decision is deny. This model has a
high rating on maintaining the confidentiality and privacy of
data, but lacks timely availability of data that is most crucial
with respect to healthcare domain. The decisions obtained
for HSA-refined policy identifies denial even when the patient’s
consent is true and the authorization is HOD. It restricts unau-
thorized disclosure thereby maintaining confidentiality and
privacy and at the same time ensuring availability of data.
The verification results detects possible policy-conflicts prevail-
ing in HSA-refined policy set and also provide counter exam-
ples to mitigate these conflicts. Thus, our framework proves to
strengthen the security policies in dynamic sharable interoper-
able healthcare environment.6. Conclusion
Access control policies of three healthcare units incorporating
unique access approaches are compared and verified with an
objective of achieving secured integration and sharing of
EHRs to relevant users. Permit/deny decision are obtained
on merging of relevant rules. The framework bridges the inter-
operable gaps between independent healthcare organizations
by ranking user/resource attributes on a similarity factor. Sim-
ilarity score basically promises to produce justifiable subsets of
matching rules and policies for the purpose of sharing data
between independent healthcare units. The security level ascer-
tains authorizations that ensure only legitimate and authorized
users would be able to access controlled data especially while
dynamically collaborating in different environments. Further
the framework identifies policy-conflicts popped up on
merging of two or more policies. Table 4 identifies the rulesPlease cite this article in press as: Bhartiya, S. et al., Proposing hierarchy-similarity ba
ing approach for interoperable environment. Journal of King Saud University
jksuci.2015.08.005resulting in policy conflicts as they contradict with the defined
property that impose a conditional constraint allowing the
access only when authorization is HOD. The interoperability
and security factors are compared (Fig. 8) with respect to shar-
ing of EHR in the discussed approaches. HSA proves to
achieve interoperability without compromising the security of
data when shared in disparate environments. Also, HSA pre-
vents and eliminates such rules thus minimizing policy conflicts
that too are traceable. This justifies the robustness of the pro-
posed framework. Moreover, if the rules obtained on the gen-
erated request are not defined in some policies, there exists no
difference in decision-making and originality of such policies.
Hence, our framework is an extension over the already
deployed security stature in an organization.
6.1. Future Scope
The current work enables integration of access control poli-
cies of independent healthcare units in a secured manner.
Policy-conflicts are detected and removed from final selection
of rules permitting/denying access to the required data. The
work can be extended to incorporate various types of
policy-conflicts categorized into semantic, syntactic, temporal
constraints. Further, access to EHR can be categorized on
the basis of requirements for different purposes such as,
emergencies and contingencies. Federated agencies like
HIPAA also propose the guidelines for designing of access
control models encompassing well-defined authorizations to
handle such cases. Handling of these cases without losing
confidentiality and privacy of the records is a major area
requiring a robust mechanism satisfying healthcare conditions
and course of actions.
Appendix A
XACML Policies in centralized, decentralized and HSA-
refined access control policies: Each policy is reduced to show
only the rules relevant to the property defined in the paper.
1. HSA-refined policies (P1, P2 and P3) of three disparate
healthcare organizations (See Fig. 9).
2. Decentralized approach: Policies (P1, P2 and P3) of three
disparate healthcare organizations (See Fig. 10).
3. Centralized approach: policies (P1, P2 and P3) of intra-
healthcare units (See Fig. 11).sed access control framework: A multilevel Electronic Health Record data shar-
– Computer and Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Figure 10 XACML policies of three disparate healthcare organizations in decentralized approach.
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Figure 11 XACML policies of three healthcare units in centralized approach.
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